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Abstract
While cloud computing is gaining popularity, diverse security and privacy issues are emerging that hinder the rapid adoption of this new computing paradigm. And the development of defensive solutions is lagging behind. To ensure a secure
and trustworthy cloud environment it is essential to identify the limitations of existing solutions and envision directions
for future research. In this paper, we have surveyed critical security and privacy challenges in cloud computing, categorized diverse existing solutions, compared their strengths and limitations, and envisioned future research directions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is defined as a service model that
enables convenient, on-demand network access to a large
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services)
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with mini-

mal management effort or service provider interaction [1].
This innovative information system architecture, which is
fundamentally changing the way that computing, storage
and networking resources are allocated and managed,
brings numerous advantages to users, including but not
limited to reduced capital costs, easy access to information, improved flexibility, automatic service integration,
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and quick deployment [2].
In spite of these advantages, as an emerging technology, cloud computing also faces tremendous security and
privacy challenges which hinder its rapid adoption. Security has been recognized as the top barrier for users to
move to cloud computing [3]. The reason is multifaceted.
First, in the cloud environment, users outsourcing their
data and applications can only rely on the Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) to protect their security. Many concerns
are raised due to the fear of the unknown. Second, the
unique characteristics of cloud computing introduce various new security challenges. Third, the immaturity of
security technologies and lack of security governance in
the cloud are obstacles to satisfy users’ security needs.
Frequent security outages in the cloud have undermined
users’ confidence in adopting this new technology. The
development of advanced research on cloud security
challenges and solutions is urgent.
On the other hand, cloud computing presents some
serious challenges to privacy. This is partly due to the
fact that a person may easily lose control of his or her
personal information under the terms and conditions of
the CSP storing the person’s information. In fact, many
cloud-based social media rely on their leverage on an
individual’s private information to make profits. Therefore, it is highly probable for these companies to have
clashes with their customers regarding their privacy policies. In this paper, we do not have separate sections that
address privacy concerns in cloud computing. Rather, we
discuss privacy in an opportunistic manner in various
sections of our paper whenever the discussion is relevant.
The goal of this paper is to propose desirable future
research directions to address the remaining challenges in
cloud computing security and privacy research. Specifically, our research objectives are to 1) identify all the
major security and privacy challenges in cloud computing, 2) conduct a thorough survey of the existing solutions,
and 3) find any deficiencies by mapping the solutions to
the challenges.

1) Data Loss and Data Breach
Data loss and data breaches were recognized as the top
threats in cloud computing environments in 2013 [5]. A
recent survey shows that 63% of customers would be less
likely to purchase a cloud service if the cloud vendor
reported a material data breach involving the loss or theft
of sensitive or confidential personal information [6].
Whether a CSP can securely maintain customers’ data
has become the major concern of cloud users. The frequent outages occurring on reputable CSPs [7], including
Amazon, Dropbox, Microsoft, Google Drive, etc., further
exacerbate such concerns.
To help customers recover in case of service failures,
data proliferation is conducted in the cloud where customers’ data is replicated in multiple data centers as
backups [8]. However, the distributed storage for multiple data copies may increase the risks of data breaches
and inconsistency. First, due to the heterogeneity of security settings for the multiple storage devices, the overall
security level of the data is only determined by the weakest link in the chain. Attackers can obtain the data if any
one of the storage devices is compromised. Second, the
multiple data copies need to be synchronized when customers make any data updates, including insertion, modification and deletion. The failures of data synchronization
will lead to data inconsistency. Last but not least, it is
more challenging for Cloud Service Users (CSUs) to
track the appropriateness of a CSP’s data operations. For
example, it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether the
CSP will completely delete all the data copies when such
a request is made by the CSU [8]. External auditing processes are required to supervise a CSP’s data operations.
2) Data Storage and Transmission under Multiple
Regional Regulations
Due to the distributed infrastructure of the cloud, cloud
users’ data may be stored on data centers geographically
located in multiple legal jurisdictions, leading to cloud
users’ concerns about the legal reach of local regulations
on data stored out of region [9]. Furthermore, the local
laws may be violated since the dynamic nature of the
cloud makes it extremely difficult to designate a specific
server or device to be used for transborder data transmission [8].

II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
In this section, we investigate the specific security and
privacy challenges in cloud computing which require the
development of advanced security technologies.

3) Cheap Data and Data Analysis
The rapid development of cloud computing has facilitated the generation of big data, leading to cheap data collections and analysis [10]. For example, many popular
online social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and
LinkedIn, are utilizing the cloud computing technology
to store and process their customers’ data [11]. Cloud
providers that store the data are gaining considerable
business revenue by either retrieving user information
through data mining and analysis by themselves or selling the data to other businesses for secondary usage [8].

A. Loss of Control
In cloud computing, loss of control refers to the situation that cloud users’ control over their data is diminished
when they move the data from their own local servers to
remote cloud servers. A great number of concerns about
data protection are raised, since giving up direct control
has to be one of the hardest things enterprises have to do
[4].
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One example is that Google is using its cloud infrastructure to collect and analyze users’ data for its advertising
network [10].
Such data usage has raised extensive privacy concerns
since the sensitive information of cloud users may be easily accessed and analyzed by unauthorized parties. The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) asked to
shut down Gmail, Google Docs, Google Calendar, and
the company’s other Web apps until government-approved
“safeguards are verifiably established” [12]. Netflix had
to cancel its $1 million data challenge prize due to a legal
suit because it violated customers’ privacy during the
data sharing process [13]. While technologies such as
data anonymization are under investigation [8], users’
data privacy has to be fundamentally protected by standards, regulations and laws.

tems, networks, memory, and storage. In a virtualized
environment, computing resources can be dynamically
created, expanded, shrunk or moved according to users’
demand, which greatly improves agility and flexibility,
reduces costs and enhances business values for cloud
computing [15].
In spite of its substantial benefits, this technology also
introduces security and privacy risks in the cloud computing environment.
1) New Access Context
Virtualization brings new challenges to user authentication, authorization and accounting in terms of properly
defining roles and policies [16]. Virtualization technology enables users to access their data and applications
running on a single logical location which is usually the
integration of multiple physical or virtual devices. The
lack of security border and isolation introduces the possibility of information leakage [17]. Furthermore, such
access can be done through a single user account logged
on from diverse devices located anywhere in the world.
This new access context raises many challenges, such as
whether a user has the same privileges to access different
physical or virtual devices; whether the accounts logged
on from multiple distant geographic locations belong to
the same user. Granular separation of user roles is
required to address these challenges [16].

B. Lack of Transparency
In the context of cloud computing security, transparency refers to the willingness of a CSP to disclose various
details on its security readiness. Some of these relevant
details include policies on security, privacy, service level,
etc. [14]. In addition to the willingness, when measuring
transparency, it is important to observe how accessible
the security readiness data and information are. No matter how much security facts about an organization are
available, if they are not presented in an organized and
easily understandable manner for CSUs and auditors, the
transparency of the organization should still be rated relatively low.
CSUs and auditors need to know the types of security
controls put in place by CSPs for their cloud infrastructure, but CSPs are often not willing to share this information. This is partially due to the fact that some of this
information can be considered to consist of trade secret.
For example, a lot of technical knowhow is involved in
effectively storing and securing customer data, and it
takes significant time and resources to reach the acceptable level of technical sophistication.
Therefore, CSUs and CSPs should negotiate on the
information to be shared. Depending on the negotiation
results, CSUs may decide not to use the services provided
by the CSP. In fact, many CSUs choose not to use CSPs
because of the frustration associated with this negotiation
process and the resulting lack of transparency. For cloud
computing to be more widely used, this challenge of
transparency is one of the biggest obstacles to be removed.

2) Attacks against Hypervisor
The hypervisor which manages multiple VMs becomes
the target of attacks [16]. Different from physical devices
which are independent from one another, VMs in the
cloud are usually residing in one physical device managed by the same hypervisor. The compromise of the
hypervisor therefore will put multiple VMs at risk. Furthermore, the immaturity of the hypervisor technology,
such as isolation, access control, security hardening, etc.,
provides attackers with new ways to exploit the system.
Diverse attacks against virtual machines are as follows.
VM Hijacking: When a VM is launched, the information required to invoke the VM is created and saved on
the host. In the multi-tenant scenario, this information for
all the VMs located in the same server will be stored on a
common storage system. The attackers gaining access to
this storage space will be able to break into the VMs,
which is called VM Hijacking [18].
VM Hopping: If an attacker gains access over the
hypervisor, he/she is able to manipulate the network traffic, configuration files, and even the connection status of
the VMs located on top of the hypervisor [19, 20].
VM Escape: Attackers gaining access to the host running multiple VMs are able to access the resources shared
by the VMs, and even bring down these resources and
turn off the hypervisor [20].
VM Mobility: A VM can be copied over the network or
through a USB, and the source configuration files are rec-

C. Virtualization Related Issues
Virtualization refers to the logical abstraction of computing resources from physical constraints. One representative example of virtualization technology is the virtual
machine (VM). Virtualization can also be performed on
many other computing resources, such as operating sys-
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reated when the VM is moved to a new location. This
way, the attackers are able to modify the configuration
file as well as the VM’s activities [19]. Furthermore, once
a VM is infected and readmitted to its original host, the
infection can potentially spread out to other VMs located
on the same host. Such an attack is also known as a virtual library check-out [21].
Dormant VMs: VMs can exist in either active or dormant states. Although the dormant VMs may still hold
sensitive user data, they can easily be overlooked and not
updated with latest security settings, leading to potential
information leakage [16].

[28], 4) cache usage attacks where the attacker measures
the utilization of CPU caches on its physical machine to
monitor the activities on co-residents’ activities [29], 5)
load-based co-residence detection where the attacker
measures the load variation of its co-resident to verify
whether it is co-located with the target victim [29], and 6)
estimating the traffic rates of the co-resident [29].
A co-resident’s performance may be degraded by overconsuming computing resources, such as CPU, memory,
storage space, I/O resources, etc. A Swiper attack is proposed in [30], with which the attacker uses a carefully
designed workload to incur significant delays on the coresident’s targeted application. In [31], the authors propose and implement an attack which modifies the workload of a victim VM in a way that frees up resources for
the attacker’s VM. The reason for the success of such
attacks is that an overload created by one tenant may negatively impact the performance of another tenant [32].

D. Multi-Tenancy Related Issues
Multi-tenancy is defined as “the practice of placing
multiple tenants on the same physical hardware to reduce
costs to the user by leveraging economies of scale” [22].
It indicates sharing of computational resources, storage,
services and applications with other tenants, hosted by
the same physical or logical platform at the provider’s
premises [23]. While the multi-tenancy architecture allows
CSPs to maximize the organizational efficiency and significantly reduce a CSU’s computing expenses, it does
not come without costs. Adversaries taking advantage of
the co-residency opportunities may launch diverse attacks
against their co-residents, resulting in a number of security/privacy challenges [24].
Specifically, in the multi-tenant environment, different
tenants’ security controls are heterogeneous. The tenant
with less security controls or misconfigurations is easier
to compromise, which may serve as a stepping stone to
the more secured tenants located in the same host. This
could reduce the overall security level for all the tenants
to that of the least secured one [16]. Furthermore, the
security policies made by different tenants may disagree
or even conflict with one another. Such disagreements or
conflicts could introduce threats to tenants’ needs, interests or concerns [25].
Furthermore, attackers taking advantage of the multitenancy architecture may be able to launch diverse attacks
against their co-tenants, such as inferring confidential
information or degrading co-tenants’ performance.
Confidential information may be inferred via sidechannel attacks. A side-channel attack is any attack based
on information gained from the physical implementation
of a system [26]. This type of attack primarily occurs due
to covert channels with flawed access control policies
that allow unauthorized access [27]. Some typical side
channel attacks include: 1) timing attacks based on measuring the time it takes for a unit to perform operations
[28], 2) power consumption attacks where the attacker
can identify system processes by analyzing the power
consumed by a unit while performing different operations
[28], and 3) differential fault analysis where the attacker
studies the behavior of a system by injecting faults into it
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E. Managerial Issues
Most cloud-specific security and privacy challenges
have their own managerial aspect. For example, the malicious insider challenge involves the problem of effectively managing employees to detect early warning signs
and responding to policy violations in a timely manner
once malicious insider incidents occur. These managerial
challenges are non-technical in nature but also closely
related to the technical solutions that could help cope
with the corresponding technical challenges. Note that
one of the biggest managerial challenges in cloud computing security is that all these technical solutions have to
be managed eventually. Implementing a technical solution and not managing it properly are bound to introduce
vulnerabilities. For example, security management for
virtualization, which is dramatically unlike that of traditional networks, requires knowledge and skill sets
beyond the capabilities of the general network administrator, leading to increased management complexity and
risks [17]. Inappropriate VM management policies may
cause the number of VMs to continuously grow while
most of them are in the middle or sleep mode (i.e., VM
sprawling), leading to the host machine’s resource exhaustion [33]. We discuss the relationship between technical
solutions and their managerial counterparts in Section IV.
Loss of control is another example of a managerial
challenge dominating its associated technical challenges.
The main source of the problem results from the fact that
in-house managerial controls are not able to reach the
computing and data resources managed by a CSP. The
managerial challenge in this case is to develop a comprehensive and effective service level agreement (SLA) to
extend the reach of the in-house security and privacy controls into the CSP organization. Often this effort leads to
power struggles between CSUs and CSPs and becomes
highly political, which require both technical and mana-
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gerial expertise in order to arrive at a mutually beneficial
solution for both CSUs and CSPs.
Finally, the lack of transparency challenge has its own
strong managerial components. CSUs and CSPs must go
through elaborate negotiations to acquire and provide
essential information to ensure the security and privacy
of the cloud services. An SLA also plays an important
role in this challenge since it helps articulate and specify
what information has to be available to satisfy the security and privacy needs of the CSU and the requirements
imposed by laws and regulations.
The fact that managerial challenges are overarching
and add to the other challenges is what makes it one of
the toughest challenges to deal with. CSPs have to make
a decision on the scope of their managerial effort in order
not to exhaust their resources before all their most critical
security and privacy goals and objectives are met.

is useful in this scenario because it allows CSPs to manage CSUs’ data by providing services such as searches,
correctness verification, and error localization [42], without having to decrypt it. Although promising, homomorphic encryption has its own disadvantages such as extra
computational and bandwidth costs. Another weakness is
exposed when attackers can detect certain patterns in the
communications associated with operations using the
homomorphic encryption [43].
Newly emerging cloud encryption methods take a step
further in terms of key management. They do not allow
any one party to take a full ownership of an encryption
key. Instead, they divide the key into pieces, each of
which is kept by CSU, CSP, and a third party data encryption service independently [44].

B. Access Control
Access control, consisting of authentication, authorization, and accounting, is a way of ensuring that the access
is provided only to the authorized users, hence the data is
stored in a secure manner [45].
A number of research projects have been conducted to
develop advanced access control techniques in terms of
properly defining roles and policies [17, 21]. For example, a Role-Based Multi-Tenancy Access Control (RBMTAC) model, which applies identity management to
determine the user’s identity and applicable roles, is
designed to efficiently manage a user’s access privilege
to achieve application independence and data isolation
[46]. In [47], the authors define and enforce access policies based on data attributes and allow the data owner to
delegate most of the computation tasks involved in finegrained data access control to untrusted cloud servers
without disclosing the underlying data contents. Furthermore, physical measures are also proposed to ensure the
access control to the hypervisor or VMs. An example is a
hardware token possessed by the administrator in order to
launch the hypervisor [48].

III. TAXONOMY OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS
Diverse defense studies have been launched to secure
the cloud computing environment. In this section, we
mainly focus on the state-of-the-art research that aims to
address the security and privacy issues in cloud computing.

A. Encryption Algorithms
At the current stage, encryption is still the major solution for addressing data confidentiality issues in cloud
computing [34, 35]. Through encryption algorithms, sensitive information is encrypted and can only be accessed
by users possessing the encryption keys. There are many
encryption schemes available, including symmetric and
asymmetric encryption methods [36–38]. El-etriby et al.
[39] compared eight modern encryption methods in the
context of cloud computing. When combined with compression, the encryption process can be more efficient as
discussed in [40].
In encryption-based schemes, one critical question is
which party should encrypt the data and manage the
encryption keys.
CSUs can entirely rely on the CSP for their encryption
needs. For example, Amazon Simple Storage Service
(S3) encrypts a CSU’s data by default. In this case, the
problem is that CSUs lose the control over ensuring the
confidentiality of their data. That is, a CSP now has full
access to CSUs’ data. Even if the CSP as a whole does
not intend to do any harm to CSUs’ data, there is also a
risk associated with malicious insiders. A rogue employee
of the CSP can always breach the confidentiality, integrity, and privacy of the CSUs’ data.
CSUs can also encrypt their data by choosing any arbitrary encryption methods and manage the encryption
keys by themselves. Many CSUs are using this approach
today to protect their data. Homomorphic encryption [41]

Yuhong Liu et al.

C. Third Party Auditing
Information system (IS) auditing refers to the activity
of examining the checks, balances, and controls within an
organization [49]. In this section we focus on the thirdparty audits (TPA), where CSUs and CSPs are not
involved in the auditing process except for providing data
and information for the independent auditors.
TPA can be used to relieve the concerns on data integrity, confidentiality, availability, and privacy. TPA can
examine at least two aspects of data integrity: while data
is in transit and while it is stationary. Regarding data confidentiality, how data is encrypted is the primary focus of
TPA. In addition, TPA checks whether the CSP conforms
to the SLAs, which can then be used to ensure data availability and privacy. TPA should also assess and evaluate
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the overall security management practices of a CSP
according to their impact on a specific audit focus, such
as data integrity, confidentiality, availability, and privacy.
The Message Authentication Codes (MAC), when combined with encryption done by either CSP, CSU, or a
third party, can provide a variable options for TPA to
check the authenticity and integrity of files stored in the
cloud against the source files [50, 51]. Although offering
a reasonable auditing choice, the use of MAC by TPA
introduces significant overhead. The main source of the
overhead is the exchange of data between CSPs and TPA
to validate MAC values. Ways to mitigate this overhead
have been developed. One example approach is to simply
exchange MAC values between TPA and CSPs rather
than the file data itself. However, this method still
requires intermittent file data transmissions.
TPA can also use other forms of authentication, such as
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Kerberos, and Secure
European System for Applications in a Multi-vendor
Environment (SESAME) [52], but these authentication
schemes by themselves do not provide integrity checks,
unlike the approaches using MAC. In particular, Kerberos is designed to provide a single sign-on capability,
which allows users to authenticate once and to be authenticated for a certain period of time without having to reauthenticate. SESAME is similar to Kerberos.
Due to the dynamic nature of data files, solutions are
required to check the integrity of the data stored in the
cloud. CSUs can download each data file segment, calculate MAC, and share the MAC with TPA, but this is not
feasible mainly due to the processing burden imposed on
the CSUs. The use of homomorphic verifiable tags
(HVT) [53] can reduce this burden, but the weakness of
this approach is that it only provides a partial coverage
for data integrity checks. That is, it is still possible that
data integrity is violated, and the integrity checks cannot
detect it. A more complete solution to the dynamic data
integrity check problem is available in the form of
dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) protocols [54,
55]. DPDP-based approaches are more comprehensive
because they cope with not only update data operations
but also other data operations, such as insert and delete
operations. The DPDP research leads to the rise of mechanisms using the Merkle hash tree (MHT) [56].

tion of transactions carried out on the same instance by
different tenants and tenants’ data or information [15,
23]. With perfect performance isolation, the execution of
one user’s service should not interfere with the performance of another user.
Current studies handle isolation from several aspects.
1) Hypervisors or virtual machine monitor (VMM), a
piece of computer software, firmware or hardware that
creates and runs virtual machines, can be utilized to facilitate isolation. For example, the original development of
the Xen hypervisor aimed to realize isolation [57]. 2)
Some software-level resource management mechanisms
are proposed to perform isolation for cache [58], disk
[59], memory bandwidth [60], and network [61]. 3)
Hardware-level solutions are proposed to allocate memory bandwidth [62] and processor caches [63] in a better
way. 4) Strict mechanisms to separate customer data are
required by cloud users [6]. 5) Security models are established to ensure isolation. In [64], the concept of tenantID is introduced on the data-link layer to securely segment, isolate and identify tenants and their assets in the
cloud. The authors in [65] propose a security model and a
set of principles to secure logical isolation between tenant
resources in a cloud storage system.

E. Soft Trust Solutions
Trust has been identified as one promising approach to
address security and privacy issues in cloud computing
[66]. However, due to the complex relationships among
diverse parties involved in the cloud environment, establishing trust in cloud is not an easy task [67]. Specifically,
‘soft’ trust is defined as the relationship between two parties for a specific action or property. That is, one party
believes that the other party will perform an action or
possess a property. Current trust studies in cloud computing focus on several aspects.
Diverse trust models have been proposed to evaluate
the trustworthiness of a CSP. For example, a dynamic
trust evaluation approach based on multi-level Dirichlet
distribution is proposed in [68]. The authors in [69] propose a formal trust management model which evaluates
the trustworthiness of SaaS in a cloud computing environment by integrating various trust properties, such as
direct trust, recommended trust, reputation factor, etc. A
trust management model based on the fuzzy set theory is
proposed in [70] to help cloud users select trustworthy
CSPs. In [71], an extensible trust evaluation model is proposed to compute the trust of CSPs by integrating a timevariant comprehensive evaluation method for expressing
direct trust and a space-variant evaluation method for calculating recommendation trust. A multi-tenancy trusted
computing environment model (i.e., MTCEM) has been
designed as a two-level hierarchy transitive trust chain
model to assure a trusted cloud infrastructure to customers [72].

D. Isolation
Due to the sharing of resources among disparate users
in the multi-tenant cloud, attackers are able to launch
diverse attacks against their co-tenants. There should be a
certain level of isolation among tenants’ data, computing
and application processes. Specifically, such isolation
should consider 1) segregation of VMs’ storage, processing, memory and access path networks in IaaS, 2) segregation of running services and API calls as well as
operating system level processes in PaaS, and 3) segrega-
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In addition, a number of studies also integrate trust
mechanisms with existing technologies to address specific security and privacy challenges in cloud computing.
In [73], a collaborative trust model of firewall-through is
proposed to ensure the security of the cloud by combining the strength of a domain-based trust model and the
feature of a firewall. In [74], a watermark-aware trusted
running environment is proposed to ensure software running in the cloud.

an overall Information Technology (IT) security governance framework mainly specifying general IT security
standards as well as how to certify organizations for
being compliant with them. As of this writing, ISO/IEC is
developing a new standard specifically addressing cloudspecific information security controls, which supplements the existing ISO/IEC 27000 series. This new standard will still be part of ISO/IEC 27000 series and be
called ISO/IEC 27017. Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU-T) is collaborating with ISO/IEC to develop ISO/
IEC 27017.
There are also special interest groups that are developing their own standards for cloud security governance.
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is one of such organizations. The goal of CSA is slightly different from that of
ISO/IEC 27017 in a sense that they are pursuing automated audit, assertion, and assurance. To accomplish this
overarching goal, they plan to provide a “common interface and namespace that allows enterprises who are interested in streamlining their audit processes” [79].
Although the new standards are emerging, in terms of
what practitioners can adopt and use, there is not much
available today. It is largely up to individual cloud security professionals to acquire knowledge in cloud computing and cloud security and to apply that knowledge to
govern various aspects of their cloud security. This is far
from being ideal, but it is part of the growing pain the
cloud industry has to go through to get to the next level of
adoption.

F. Hard Trust Solutions
In the cloud computing model, customer views are
limited to a virtual infrastructure typically built on top of
non-trusted physical hardware or operating environments.
Hardware-based security solutions are envisioned as a
natural trend that a CSP will be likely to follow in coming
years to resolve different data privacy and integrity issues
[75].
Specifically, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [76]
proposed a set of hardware and software technologies to
enable the construction of trusted platforms. Trusted
computing is the industry’s response to growing security
problems in the enterprise and is based on hardware root
trust. The TCG proposed a standard for the design of the
trusted platform module (TPM) chip that is now bundled
with commodity hardware. Currently, the TPM is the
only standardized physical device to measure trust indicators in open platforms [77]. In general, TPM consists of
three basic components, the root of trust for measurement, the root of trust for reporting, and the root of trust
for storage [78]. In particular, TPM is designed for secure
key generation, cryptographic operations, user authentication, and remote attestations. The TPM has been
widely adopted to address security issues in the cloud. A
trusted computing based Federated Identity Management
(FIM) framework is proposed in [78] to solve the issue of
identity theft in a cloud computing environment. In particular, the proposed method highlights the use of the
TPM, virtual TPM (VTPM), OpenID protocols, and single sign-on (SSO) to support the tasks of authentication,
authorization and identity federation in a trusted computing framework.

H. Summary
Based on the above discussions, we can classify the
existing solutions according to three criteria: 1) solution
adopter, which party can use the solution to address security/privacy issues, 2) reaction, whether the solution is
used to prevent/predict the occurrence of attacks, or to
respond to attacks after the occurrence, and 3) hardware
or software, the solution addresses security/privacy challenges from hardware or software perspective. The
detailed classification is summarized in Table 1.

G. Governance

IV. SOLUTION COMPARISON AND OPEN
RESEARCH ISSUES

Governance refers to a comprehensive set of activities
associated with planning and implementing controls. In
the context of cloud security, it is still too early to expect
a mature governance framework to appear, but there are
some initial signs of a cloud-specific security governance
framework emerging. In particular, there are efforts being
made to extend the existing security standards, such as
Purchasing Card Industry-Data Security Standards (PCIDSS) series by creating cloud security guidelines.
Another example is ISO/IEC 27000 series which provide
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In this section, we compare the existing solutions in
terms of what challenges they can address and their limitations.
Encryption: Encryption can partially address the challenges associated with malicious insiders by preventing
them from obtaining sensitive data and information in
their readable format. However, encryption cannot be an
ultimate solution to insider attacks since the insider may
turn out to be a person who could legitimately decrypt the
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Table 1. Classification of existing solutions
Solution adopter

Reaction

CSP

CSU

Third party

Proactive

Encryption

√

√

√

√

Access control

√

√

TPA
√

Trust

√

TPM

√

√

Governance

Reactive

Hardware

√
√

√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√
√

Software
√

√
√

Isolation

Hardware/Software

√

√
√

TPA: third-party audits, TPM: trusted platform module.

encrypted data or information.
Encryption could be an effective solution to a loss of
control situation. When a CSP is safeguarding a CSU’s
data, encryption could serve as an extra layer to prevent
security breach. For the same reason, encryption helps
with the multi-tenancy and virtualization challenges since
it provides additional protection against a potential attempt
from a tenant to steal the data or information belonging to
another tenant who may be residing on the same physical
machine.
Related to security management, encryption, in fact,
generates more problems due to the additional complexity introduced by various cloud computing scenarios. For
example, one apparent problem is deciding on who is
responsible for doing the encryption. Is it the CSU, CSP,
or third party? How should encryption keys be handled?
Who has the right to decrypt the data? These questions
are remaining to be answered by emerging research
works in cloud computing security.
The major limitation of encryption algorithms is the
encryption overhead, especially the computational burden. This burden becomes even bigger when the data to
be encrypted is more dynamic in nature. For example, a
log file is constantly updated, which will require an additional number of encryption attempts compared to more
static files.
Access Control: By appropriately defining whether a
user has the privilege to perform a given action on an
object at a fine-grained level, access control schemes can
be deployed by CSPs to effectively resist malicious insiders and DoS/DDoS attacks. Authentication and authorization models are developed to control users’ access to
the physical and virtual resources in the multi-tenant
environment [80, 81]. In additions, CSUs can gain better
control over their data/applications by designing their own
access control policies [82].
The limitations of access control schemes are twofold.
1) Fine-grained access control schemes may introduce
high complexity that limits their scalability. How to
simultaneously achieve the goals of fine-grainedness and
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scalability for access control in cloud computing remains
an open issue. 2) Access control architectures usually
assume that the data owners and the data servers are in
the same security domain, where the data servers are
fully trusted to commit access control policies. However,
this assumption may not hold in the cloud environment,
where data owners and cloud servers are usually in two
different security domains [47]. Even if perfect access
control policies are made by the data owner, it is still
highly risky that cloud servers may arbitrarily access the
data by themselves or not strictly follow the policies to
control the access from third parties. One feasible solution
is to ensure the fulfillment of data owners’ access control
policies through other solutions, such as encryption.
Third Party Auditing: TPA is helpful with deterring
malicious insider attacks. By auditing the activities of the
employees, it is more probable for a security team to
detect any suspicious activities indicating the existence of
a malicious insider. Since auditing is typically done after
the fact, TPA may not be able to detect DoS attacks in
real time. However, there is an emerging trend to automate the auditing process, and the detection of DoS
attacks could be one of the responsibilities of TPA, but
the reporting of the attacks may still occur once they are
over.
TPA can be a primary control to prevent loss of control
since it can be used to assess and evaluate how much of
the control over IT resources is truly transferred to a CSP
when a CSU adopts cloud computing. Due to the ongoing
nature of auditing, a CSU can effectively track the balance between its own control over the IT resources and
that of a CSP.
TPA can also improve the transparency of a CSP by
demanding more information on various aspects of CSP
security readiness. How much information could be
available to a CSU still depends on the CSP, but the
leverage the CSU has in terms of purchasing the cloud
services and offering revenue potentials for the CSP can
have a significant impact on the degree of transparence to
be demonstrated by the CSP.
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TPA can partially handle multi-tenancy and virtualization challenges by helping to discover potential security
breaches in the multi-tenancy and virtualization environments. Finally, TPA is an essential mechanism in managing security. Without auditing, it is impossible to do any
type of security management.
The major limitation of TPA is its after-the-fact nature
which makes it incapable of detecting an anomaly and
reacting to it in real time. Furthermore, there are some
areas of TPA that have not been heavily studied. For
example, the auditing of data availability and access control problems, such as authorization and accountability,
are largely missing in the discussions of the existing literature. This indicates much room for growth in terms of
research in these topics.
Isolation: Isolation based schemes are mainly proposed to address security issues caused by multi-tenancy
and virtualization. By creating dedicated logical devices
for each single tenant, the isolation based schemes aim to
ensure perfect isolation where one tenant’s performance
is not interfered with by other tenants running on the
same physical hardware. However, due to the absence of
physical isolation, smart attackers are still able to launch
attacks penetrating the virtual boundaries among tenants
[30]. Although extensive schemes are proposed to patch
the vulnerabilities on the virtual boundaries [83–87], they
are either application-specific or insufficient for fully mitigating the risk. At the current state of the art, there is no
practical way to guarantee unconditional security except
for physically isolating cloud users [29].
Soft Trust: The establishment of trust in the cloud
could improve the detection of malicious behaviors, promote collaborations among trustworthy parties and further facilitate the broad adoption of cloud computing
technology. Specifically, trust based solutions can detect
and prevent malicious insiders through the evaluation of
insiders’ trustworthiness. Through the establishment of
trust, CSUs will be more confident about CSPs’ protection of their data, and the concerns about loss of control
can be relieved. There are efforts being made to establish
a reputation profile for CSPs based on CSUs’ experiences.
Such a reputation profile provides an effective way to
improve a CSP’s transparency. Furthermore, through the
evaluation of users’ trustworthiness, trust-based solutions
can reduce the risks of multi-tenancy and virtualization
by excluding users of low trustworthiness from the
resource sharing environment.
There are also some limitations of current trust-based
schemes. 1) While extensive studies have been conducted
on evaluating a CSP’s trustworthiness, the evaluations on
CSUs, computing resources and other entities in the
cloud are still in their initial stage. 2) Trust evaluation criteria in different studies are not consistent. The lack of
standardized evaluation criteria makes it extremely difficult
to compare different trust evaluation results. 3) Entities’
trustworthiness is mainly evaluated qualitatively. Quanti-
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tative trust computation algorithms are required to accurately evaluate and compare the reliability of entities. 4)
Current schemes are mostly ad-hoc, which can only partially ensure the cloud security and privacy [88]. A unified framework which integrates comprehensive trust
evaluations on diverse entities involved in the cloud environment is on demand. Advanced trust-based solutions
are under investigations to address such limitations.
Hard Trust (TPM): TPM serves as a physical device
to measure trust indicators in open platforms. It is bundled with commodity hardware that provides great flexibility in addressing some common security issues in
cloud computing (e.g., restricting malicious insiders,
access control in a multitenant environment, etc.). The
success of cloud computing heavily depends on how
comfortable the customers are in outsourcing their sensitive data, losing control, and relying on the CSP’s security controls. The CSUs need assurances from CSPs
before the actual migration. TPM can play a vital role in
strengthening the customer’s trust by providing strong
assurances about the integrity of their data and the cloud
infrastructure.
TPM can be effectively used to prevent insiders from
performing different malicious activities such as gaining
access to customers’ confidential information or accessing the shared resources without proper authorization,
etc. In particular, TPM provides a federated identity management framework with a single sign-on to support the
tasks of authentication, authorization, and identity federation in a trusted computing framework. The implementation of TPM at the service provider level provides both
local and remote user authentication protocols that serve
as the first layer of defense against the malicious insiders.
TPM can effectively protect both platform and information integrity in the multi-tenant environment through
a remote authentication mechanism with hardware-based
attestation capabilities. Furthermore, in a virtualized environment where multiple operating systems run concurrently, VTMP provides an effective solution to facilitate
the secure migration of virtual machines between similar
and different platforms. Moreover, TPM-based authentication protocols provide both the elements of trust (e.g.,
establishing the trusted log between the communication
parties) and privacy for secure authentication and platform integrity in the cloud.
Since TPM was originally designed to provide security
guarantees on a single node, performance can suffer in a
distributed environment, such as cloud data centers where
multiple operating systems, applications, and cloud services run concurrently. Cloud services are expected to be
highly scalable at run time, which becomes an issue when
TPM is used as a primary security measure. Moreover,
TPM allows customers to remotely verify data integrity
or perform remote attestation, which can overexpose the
cloud infrastructure and provide valuable information to
outsiders. The external attackers can make use of this
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Table 2. Security & privacy challenges vs. solutions
LoC

LoT

Multi-tenancy

Virtualization

Management
√

Encryption

√

√

√

Access control

√

√

√

TPA

√

√

Isolation
Trust

√

√

TPM

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Governance

√

√

TPA: third-party audits, TPM: trusted platform module, LoC: loss of control, LoT: lack of transparency.

information to trace the potential vulnerabilities in the
infrastructure and set up the actual attack.
Governance: Governance solutions mainly address
the managerial challenges in cloud security. However, all
the technical solutions to the technology-centric cloud
security challenges are also dependent on how well the
technical countermeasures are managed in one way or
another. For example, the managerial aspect of encryption is critical. If users do not safeguard their encryption
keys, whether data is encrypted or not does not matter
anymore. A similar situation arises for the strength of
encryption keys.
Access control is also heavily dependent on management. To develop an efficient access control list, it is crucial to first develop proper policies and identify what to
protect. Prioritization is another important facet of access
control since not every asset can be protected. Developing policies, enumerating assets, and prioritizing them all
require human intervention, which is part of the security
management process.
Human auditors are at the forefront of TPA. It may be
possible to collect some information automatically, but a
significant portion of TPA is conducted by human auditors. They interview relevant personnel in an organization
being audited, who can, in turn, collect either manually or
automatically generated data for the auditors. Audit
report writing is another part of TPA, which cannot afford
full automation. Auto-generated audit reports are possible, but they could be overwhelming in terms of the
amount of data being presented. An auditor still needs to
sift through the data to emphasize more relevant data
while deleting unimportant data. In addition, an in-depth
analysis section of the audit report cannot be automatically generated.
Different isolation levels can be set to separate a VM
from its neighboring VMs. If the VMs are from different
CSUs who specify strong isolation in the SLAs, it is necessary for CSPs to strive to set the isolation level of the
VM to its maximum degree. However, human errors can
still occur and misconfiguration is possible. Therefore,
management is an important factor here, too.
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Trust is partially related to TPA. The auditing can also
be done by internal auditors. Whether conducted internally or externally, the auditing process should be managed well to produce meaningful results. Positive audit
results over an extended period of time form a basis of
building trust between CSUs and CSPs. Most of the trust
model services that are available today involves auditors
compiling and analyzing audit results to make an objective security assessment of a CSP. Therefore, management activities are again indispensable in the context of
trust. Since the scope of security governance is overwhelming, managing expectations and prioritizing various governance activities themselves become a challenge.
In addition, as mentioned in Section II-E, one of the biggest deficiencies in cloud security governance today is a
lack of cloud-specific governance frameworks. However,
this deficiency is slowly and partially being addressed by
newly emerging standards addressing cloud-specific governance concerns, such as ISO/IEC 27017.
Summary: We summarize the relationship between
security/privacy challenges and the existing solutions in
Table 2, where each row represents a specific solution,
and each column represents one security/privacy challenge. The cell in row m and column n is checked if solution m can be used to address or partially address the
challenge n.

V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As an emerging and rapidly developing computing
scenario, cloud computing has introduced a number of
challenges. In this paper, we have analyzed some critical
security and privacy challenges in cloud computing, categorized diverse existing solutions, and have compared
their strengths and limitations. Based on the discussions,
we envision three future research directions to secure the
cloud environment.
First, the development of advanced solutions to address
the management-oriented security/privacy challenges is
urgent. From Table 2, we can observe that the lack of
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transparency and management issues are two remaining
challenges which are not covered by many existing solutions. Different from other challenges, which are techniqueoriented, these two challenges are more management-oriented. While security/privacy threats from both technique
and management aspects may cause severe damage to the
cloud environment, most of current studies only focus on
the technique-oriented challenges. There is a lack of
advanced solutions to deal with the security/privacy issues
from the management perspective.
Second, the integration of multiple solutions from different categories provides a great potential to address
security/privacy issues that cannot be addressed by a single, ad-hoc security solution.
For example, by integrating encryption and access
control, CSUs are able to ensure the fulfillment of their
access control policies on the cloud server [47, 82, 89].
By integrating trust models with encryption schemes,
CSUs can protect their data confidentiality by only allowing trustworthy CSPs to decrypt and process their sensitive data [90]. Privacy cheating can be discouraged by
bridging secure storage and secure computation auditing
in the cloud [91, 92]. However, how to seamlessly integrate different security solutions remains an open challenge.
Third, stimulating the security cooperation among
diverse stakeholders, including CSP, CSU and many third
parties, in the cloud scenario is very challenging. The
involvement of diverse parties in the cloud makes the
security/privacy issues complicated since security objectives for different parties can be very different, and sometimes these objectives may even conflict with one
another. For example, a CSU may require CSPs to be
more transparent about their security controls so that it
can choose the most secure CSP. Nevertheless, a CSP
may need to protect its entire cloud infrastructure by not
revealing details about its security settings. Establishing
trust relationships among diverse parties, which enables
negotiation and tradeoffs, may serve as a promising solution.
While cloud computing is rapidly gaining popularity,
diverse security and privacy issues are emerging against
this new computing paradigm. However, the development of security and privacy solutions is lagging behind.
Research challenges as well as opportunities are remaining. The resolution of these security and privacy issues
will serve as the key to enable the rapid adoption of cloud
computing.
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